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Abstract:  
The attempt to revolutionize Bolivia that began with the election of Evo Morales in 2005 has led 
to the breakdown of constitutional democracy and the polarization of the country between the 
poorer, indigenous western highlands and the (slightly) more prosperous, more heavily mestizo, 
and more market-friendly eastern lowlands (what Bolivians call the media luna or ―half-moon‖). 
The trajectory of relative stability and economic growth followed from the 1980s onward now 
threatens to devolve into constitutional stalemate at best and violent civil conflict at worst.  
  
Article: 
On 28 February 2008, numerous supporters of the government of President Evo Morales and his 
Movement to Socialism (MAS) congregated in the central plaza of La Paz, Bolivia, on yet 
another sunny, windy, and cool day in a city situated at 12,000 feet above sea level. While they 
encircled the neoclassical legislative palace, the progovernment majority in the lower house of 
Congress approved bills to submit their party's draft constitution and one of its articles (fixing the 
maximum size of agricultural estates at 10,000 hectares) to the voters for their approval. While 
some opposition deputies voted against the bill, other antigovernment legislators either boycotted 
the session or found themselves deterred by the crowd from entering the building. Several 
protestors had physically barred two female deputies from going inside, knocking one of them 
down in a moment captured on film. Under the laws governing the approval of a new 
constitution, these two referendums could not be held simultaneously, nor could Congress have 
enacted these bills only hours after receiving them.
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The February 28 legislative vote brought to a head several years of often vitriolic and 
occasionally violent dispute about the future of Bolivia, a conflict that pitted the power of the 
streets against a duly elected but discredited political class. The February vote, in fact, was the 
culmination of the MAS leadership's decision to violate the agreement reached with the 
opposition, whereby two-thirds of delegates elected to a Constituent Assembly needed to 
approve the draft constitution as a whole before submitting it to the voters for final endorsement. 
In sessions held in early December 2007 from which opposition deputies were absent, the 
Assembly illegally promulgated a draft constitution whose final approval will signal whether the 
MAS has succeeded in consolidating a new political and social order in Bolivia. 
 
These are also events in a narrative stretching back to at least 2000, when social movements 
mobilized to prevent the privatization of water supplies in the city of Cochabamba and also later 
in El Alto, a settlement overlooking La Paz that is home to many migrants from rural areas. Two 
years later, the social movements, including the highly organized coca growers (cocaleros) in the 
Chapare region of the department of Cochabamba, persuaded large numbers of their fellow 
Bolivians to cast ballots for cocalero leader Evo Morales. In the presidential election later that 
year, Morales—a former deputy whom a legislative majority had stripped of his congressional 
seat earlier in 2002—nearly outpolled first-place finisher Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, an ex-
president who was running as the candidate of the Revolutionary National Movement (MNR). 
Three-and-a-half years (and two presidents) later, Morales won 53.7 percent, dispensing with the 
need to hold a runoff in Congress. Armed with a majority in the lower house and a near-majority 
in the Senate, Morales swiftly acted upon his mandate to nationalize the country's bountiful 
natural-gas deposits, reverse market-friendly policies, and convene elections for a Constituent 
Assembly to "refound" Bolivia. 
 
 
Map-—Bolivia ' s Departments 
 
This radical turn to the left put a definitive end to Bolivia's fifteen-year stint as a "model 
country" that combined democracy with market-friendly policies. Between 2003 and 2008, the 
Bolivian political system fell from the 31st to the 74th slot on the Bertelsmann Management 
Index, a composite measure of the success of 116 political systems to advance an agreed-upon 
set of development goals within a stable democratic framework. 
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 Morales's election also marked 
the start of yet another revolutionary experiment in one of South America's poorest countries, 
and one in which almost two-thirds of adults identify with one of more than thirty indigenous 
groups and call themselves mestizos ("mixed blood" or people sharing or claiming both Native 
American and European heritage).
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The attempt to revolutionize Bolivia has led to the breakdown of constitutional democracy and to 
the polarization of the country between the poorer, indigenous western highlands and the 
(slightly) more prosperous, more heavily mestizo, and more market-friendly eastern lowlands (a 
mostly tropical swath that Bolivians call the media luna or "half-moon" for the way it curves 
around the eastern flank of the Andes). The August 2008 victories of both Morales and the 
elected prefects of four eastern departments—his most vigorous critics—in Bolivia's first-ever 
set of recall referendums have only deepened the regional fragmentation of the body politic. The 
future promises fragile stalemate at best, and at worst, a spiral into violent civil conflict. 
 
The Years of Stability 
Although the history of Bolivia is filled with extraconstitutional seizures of power and military 
governments, by the mid-1980s it had become a stable country. Political succession had become 
orderly with the 1985 election of the MNR's Víctor Paz Estenssoro, an ex-president and one-time 
leader of the 1952 revolution. Paz's final presidency not only marked the beginning of fifteen 
years of stable democracy, but also a dramatic shift in political economy. If the revolution stood 
for nationalizing the means of production, establishing universal franchise rights, and enacting 
radical agrarian reform, President Paz's final term in office initiated a series of changes that 
would make Bolivia a model country for neoliberal reform. 
 
Macroeconomic stabilization (or "shock therapy"), advised by none other than Jeffrey Sachs, 
succeeded in eradicating inflation. When Paz became president, the annual inflation rate 
exceeded 4,000 percent, the government was running a fiscal deficit equal to 23.4 percent of 
GDP, and the country had given up paying interest on its foreign debt. Economic crisis, along 
with the inability to forge stable governing coalitions, had forced President Hernán Siles Zuazo 
of the left-wing Democratic and Popular Unity coalition to cut his term short by a year. 
 
The administrations of Jaime Paz Zamora (1989–93) and Sánchez de Lozada (whose first term 
ran from 1993 to 1997) implemented wide-ranging structural reforms. Under Paz, the 
government granted the Central Bank formal independence, reformed public administration, and 
began the privatization of small state-owned enterprises. In a concession to widespread support 
for nationalized industries, Sánchez de Lozada's first administration refrained from privatizing 
state corporations in petroleum and gas, the railroads, air transport, or any of the other areas that 
the Bolivian state had come to control. Instead, the administration created an innovative program 
under which a private-sector buyer could purchase a 50 percent controlling share of a state 
company. Private pension funds would then become responsible for the remaining 50 percent of 
the "capitalized" firm's stock, which would end up paying dividends in the form of an annual 
pension (known as the Bonosol) to elderly Bolivians. Sánchez de Lozada also obtained 
legislative support for ambitious social goals, including schooling in indigenous languages as 
well as Spanish, the creation of more than 310 municipalities that as a group would receive 20 
percent of central-government revenues, and administrative decentralization. Bolivia's extensive 
economic reforms came to be touted as a model worthy of emulation because they combined 
responsible macroeconomic policies with institutional reforms that would lay the basis for 
sustained and equitable growth.
4
 
 
The transformation of Bolivian politics not only made structural reform possible, but also raised 
hopes that political instability was a thing of the past. Both left and right in the country's 
multiparty system agreed to abide by election results, no matter how unpalatable these might be. 
In 1989, when a left-right coalition in Congress made left-wing candidate Jaime Paz Zamora 
president despite his third-place finish in the popular vote, first-place finisher Sánchez de Lozada 
and his party did not stage street protests or urge military intervention. The depth of the 
economic crisis and dependence on multilateral financial institutions had led to a convergence on 
market-friendly policies and liberal-democratic institutions. 
 
Certain features of the political and party system made it possible to stabilize politics and 
implement structural reforms. Electoral laws reduced temptations to defect from the new policy 
equilibrium. The 1967 Constitution kept a time-honored provision under which Congress could 
select the president should no candidate obtain an absolute majority of the popular vote (hence 
Paz Zamora's elevation over Sánchez de Lozada in 1989). Equally important was the fused-ballot 
system, which forced voters to choose their preferred presidential and legislative candidates from 
the same party. Straight-ticket voting secured seemingly predictable vote shares, yielding an 
average of 3.92 effective parties between 1985 and 2002. These two features also fueled 
cooperative executive legislative relations, because the same congressional coalition that elected 
a president also obtained seats in his cabinet. Since attacking the new policy consensus meant 
suffering a lockout from cabinet posts and other spoils, the longstanding patronage concerns of 
Bolivian parties made them forgo sharp ideological conflict in favor of a focus on obtaining state 
jobs and public-works contracts for their supporters and donors.
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It was none other than a neoliberal electoral reform that helped to undermine the political 
foundations of the newfound liberal policy consensus. 
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 In the mid-1990s, Bolivia went from 
closed-list proportional representation (PR) to a German-style, mixed-member proportional 
(MMP) system that expanded voters' choices and fueled a market for antiestablishment parties. 
Under the new system, each voter could not only select the congressional representative from his 
or her single-member plurality district (SMPD)—there were sixty of these—but could also use 
fused ballots to select another sixty deputies in multimember PR districts. Adopted in 1994 and 
first used in 1997, the MMP system allowed SMPD candidates to bypass the leaders of existing 
parties and appeal directly to voters. Morales's first elective office was one of these seats, which 
he won with the largest majority of any such candidate in the 1997 elections. 
 
By the late 1990s, social movements throughout the country were beginning to revive an 
antiestablishment discourse. Morales himself began his career as a leader of the Chapare-based 
coca growers. This powerful network not only levied taxes and provided coca growers' families 
with basic services, but violently resisted the Bolivian army's U.S.-financed campaign to 
eradicate nontraditional coca. (Estimates by U.S. authorities suggest that the 30,000 hectares 
given over to coca cultivation in the Yungas region along the eastern foothills of the Andes are 
for customary use, while the coca grown in the Chapare goes overwhelmingly to the 
international drug trade.) 
 
Neighborhood associations in the cities of Cochabamba and El Alto organized to reverse water 
privatization. Landless peasants mobilized across the country. Radical Aymaras around La Paz, 
led by Felipe Quispe, demanded tractors and agricultural support for their rural communities. As 
the MAS began to organize, it built bridges between these diverse interests, using existing 
organizations to assemble a broader movement with revolutionary ambitions. The MAS and its 
allies targeted neoliberalismo, a catchall term of scorn that blamed the country's ills on the 
economic and social reforms of the previous fifteen years. 
 
Surveys indicate that Bolivia has a large constituency for radical politics. The Americas 
Barometer's first nationally representative poll of Bolivians in 1998 revealed that only slightly 
more than 10 percent of survey respondents were both highly supportive of the political system 
and highly tolerant of the political rights of individuals who wished to make negative comments 
about that system. Nearly half those polled expressed low levels of both system support and 
political tolerance. In the biennial surveys conducted between 1998 and 2006, these percentages 
barely changed.
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Economic facts seemed to have turned many Bolivians against the liberal policy consensus. 
Unimpressive growth rates did not help the established parties to make their case before a 
skeptical electorate, even though inflation was low and social indicators were gradually 
improving (for example, the share of the populace living in poverty fell from more than 80 
percent in 1976 to slightly less than 60 percent in 2001). Extensive structural reform had done 
little to raise the growth rate of per capita GDP above the anemic 0.6 percent that it had averaged 
between 1952 and 1982. Between 1985 and 2000, the economy's average growth in per capita 
terms was only 0.9 percent a year, and actually became negative during the worldwide recession 
of 1999 to 2001. 
 
Structural reforms, moreover, failed to overcome long-term political weaknesses. A World Bank 
survey-based study of the institutional roots of Bolivia's "tepid" growth shows that cronyism, 
corruption, and the general disregard for the rule of law reduced the profitability of companies as 
well as the transparency and effectiveness of the public sector.
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 While there were pockets of 
excellence in both the private and public sectors, firms had to be large and politically well 
connected to benefit from holding formal, tax-paying status. So even if, in the 1990s, inflation 
was low and the exchange rate was stable, the feeble Bolivian state did little to help lift the 
country's growth rate. State weakness also lay at the root of the political-legitimacy crisis, one 
that made—and continues to make—it hard for elected officials to persuade Bolivians to pay 
taxes, to stop importing and consuming contraband goods (a habit that had cost the state US$430 
million in lost revenues by 1997), and, as we shall see, to refrain from toppling governments. 
 
Commodities, Nationalism, and Neoliberalismo 
Changing commodity markets created a golden political opportunity for the social movements to 
appeal to a national-level audience. As oil and natural-gas prices began to climb with the start of 
the new millennium, foreign energy companies began to cash in on several years of investments 
that a liberalized energy policy regime had encouraged. This provided an opening for nationalist 
complaints, often voiced with a leftist spin, that "foreign capitalists" were "exploiting" Bolivia's 
natural-gas resources, which in terms of proven reserves are the second-largest in South America 
(only Venezuela's are larger). Ratcheting up the intensity of nationalist feeling was the 
realization that landlocked Bolivia's only alternative to depending on the Brazilian and Argentine 
markets to buy Bolivian gas exports would be transhipment across northern Chile. This was a 
fraught prospect, since the very land that the gas would have to traverse had been conquered 
from Bolivia by Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879–83), a continuing source of rancor in 
Bolivian politics. 
 
Bolivia's antisystem forces were able to use these issues to claim that neoliberals had violated the 
national interest. Rising commodity prices therefore changed the premises of political debate, as 
ever-larger numbers of Bolivians came to believe that the terms offered to foreign energy 
companies (when gas prices were low, a point often forgotten in domestic debates) had been 
overly generous and had thus deprived Bolivians of their rightful share of rents from such a 
valuable resource.
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Social protest began to escalate by the late 1990s. From a low of an average of 13 protests per 
month during Sánchez de Lozada's first presidency (1993–97), the social movements organized 
an average of 28 protests per month during Hugo Banzer's term (1997–2002).
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 For the social 
movements, marches and road blockades were a way to "speak truth to power" and part of a 
more general struggle to rid the country of neoliberalismo. For the MAS's critics, these tactics 
exposed the MAS's commitment to democracy as merely instrumental. Many social protestors, in 
fact, were not simply aiming to pressure the government, but to spark another social revolution.
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While participating in elections and taking seats in Congress and on municipal councils, the 
MAS was also using the institutions of democracy not only to contest the government, but to 
undermine democracy itself. 
 
By September 2003, protest marches demanding the nationalization of gas deposits and the 
president's resignation had turned violent. At one point, protestors blockaded—and even fired 
upon—busloads of foreign and domestic tourists who were trying to return to La Paz from the 
nearby town of Sorata (an armed police escort led by Defense Minister Carlos Sánchez Berzaín 
eventually rescued the travelers). During the blockade of La Paz that deprived city inhabitants of 
food and fuel, the military fired upon blockaders, killing at least 27 of them. The government 
split over how it should react to the crisis. Vice-President Carlos Mesa, a popular author and 
former television presenter, counseled negotiations while President Sánchez de Lozada and his 
confidants organized their self-styled defense of democracy. Once the military, the police, and 
Congress abandoned the president, he resigned his post on 17 October 2003 and left the country 
for exile in the United States, turning power over to Mesa.
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Mesa used his initial high popularity ratings to persuade Congress to back his plans to hold a 
series of referendums. The first of these, held before the end of 2004, revealed that more than 90 
percent of the voters wanted to renegotiate international energy contracts.
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Street protestors demanded that energy contracts be nationalized, which led legislators to hike 
taxes and royalties on gas companies. Despite his efforts to find middle ground, Mesa proved no 
more capable than his predecessor had been of coping with daily marches and frequent 
blockades. Protests soared, reaching an average of 49 per month during Mesa's presidency. By 
early June 2005, Mesa had on several occasions publicly committed himself to resigning before 
finally turning power over to Eduardo Rodríguez, president of the Supreme Court, even though 
the constitution mandated that the president of the Senate should assume the presidency. 
 
Morales's 53.7 percent win of the presidency in the early election of 18 December 2005 (the 
normal election date would have been 2007) marked the definitive end of the consensus-oriented 
multiparty system. Leftist movements had managed to convert a plethora of local and regionally 
based sectoral movements into a political project with majority support. The runner-up, former 
president Jorge Quiroga of the Social Democratic Power (Podemos) party, obtained just 28.6 
percent. The ability of MAS to appeal to nonindigenous as well as indigenous voters from a 
variety of class backgrounds showed that it had outgrown its origins as a mostly rural social 
movement. It had become a credible, national-level political force that appealed to an 
increasingly leftist electorate, one that strongly favored nationalizing the country's recently 
discovered gas reserves.
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The MAS Bid for Hegemony 
There were at least two ways of interpreting the results of the 2005 presidential voting. One 
noted that (slightly less than) one out of every two voters had not supported the MAS, meaning 
that the country was evenly divided between MAS supporters and opponents. This perspective 
counseled action to expand MAS support among centrist voters. Another perspective claimed 
that the MAS had obtained a mandate from the electorate to revolutionize Bolivian society and 
politics. The future stability of the country, already frayed by more than five years of vitriolic 
debate and almost daily street protests, hinged upon how the government would choose to 
interpret the December 2005 vote. 
 
In his inaugural speech, the new president informed his country—and "especially [his] brother 
indigenous peoples of the Americas"—that "we will take power for five-hundred years." When 
Morales's approval rating shot up to 80 percent in the wake of his nationalization of gas reserves 
on May Day 2006, his belief that the electorate wanted the MAS to overhaul Bolivian society 
seemed to have found its confirmation. The MAS's plan to produce a constitution unilaterally 
was signaled by the party's proposal that all the Constituent Assembly delegates should be 
chosen by straight-ticket, simple-plurality voting in three-member districts. 
 
The results of the 2 July 2006 Constituent Assembly elections, however, demonstrated that the 
electorate remained divided. The MAS saw its share of the national vote fall to 50.9 percent. 
Even with a favorable electoral law (one negotiated with the MAS's opponents) that awarded the 
party with the largest number of votes, two-thirds of the seats in three-member constituencies, 
the MAS managed to win only 137 seats (53.7 percent) in the 255-member Assembly.
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 This 
result fell well short of two-thirds control, even taking into account the dozen or so non MAS 
deputies who could be counted on to back the MAS line. Podemos spearheaded the opposition 
with 60 seats. 
 
A referendum that would have obliged the Assembly to grant more autonomy to the nine 
departments was held concurrently with the Assembly elections. Morales's administration 
successfully opposed this referendum, but regional voting patterns confirmed the reality of 
accelerating geographic polarization. The measure won overwhelmingly in the eastern 
departments of the "half-moon," that is, in Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz, and Tarija, where half the 
country's population lives and which produce nearly half the GDP. This suggests that—contrary 
to the MAS's dismissive claims—the desire for departmental autonomy was more than just the 
self-serving rallying cry of the large-scale farmers and rich cattlemen in Santa Cruz whom the 
MAS calls "the oligarchy." The presence of more than four-fifths of Bolivia's proven gas 
reserves in Tarija, which sits along the country's southern border near Argentina and Paraguay, 
makes the stakes of the autonomy debate that much higher.
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On 6 August 2006, the Constituent Assembly began meeting in Sucre, the de jure capital and the 
seat of the Supreme Court, which is located in the south-central department of Chuquisaca. 
Before long, a struggle over internal rules of procedure broke out within the Assembly. The 
wrangling would consume seven months, and its course would lay bare the depth of distrust 
between the MAS and its critics as well as the MAS's own inner rifts over whether to 
compromise. In a midnight session held secretly and with no opposition members present on 29 
November 2006, matters reached a low point when the MAS deputies voted to allow a simple 
rather than a two-thirds majority to approve a draft constitution for submission to the voters. (As 
noted above, the March 2006 "law of convocation" that Congress had used to call the Assembly 
had declared that approval of a draft constitution would require a two-thirds vote of all 
members.) Infuriated by this maneuver, opposition delegates paralyzed Assembly deliberations 
with a quorum-denying boycott. Opposition parties also organized hunger strikes and boycotted 
congressional deliberations in La Paz. In negotiations led by Vice-President Alvaro García 
Linera, the MAS agreed in mid-February 2007 to reinstate the two-thirds requirement. 
 
Originally the Assembly had been meant to sit for only a year, with an August 2007 deadline for 
producing a new constitution. The intense procedural tussle had hampered substantive work so 
badly, however, that there was no hope of meeting that target date. While the MAS wanted the 
Assembly to create a new polity, the opposition simply wanted to amend the existing 
constitution. Many MAS delegates and supporters began to conclude that the opposition's 
procedural objections meant that it was just stalling, especially after mid-2007 brought news that 
inflation was threatening to exceed 15 percent a year. Disagreement about the substantive ends 
of constitutional change, the MAS believed, meant that the opposition was little more than a 
creature of oligarchic interests based in Santa Cruz. For its part, the opposition interpreted the 
lack of progress as evidence that the MAS wanted to impose—not negotiate—a new constitution. 
 
By early August, convention delegates were asking Congress, as the body that had given birth to 
the Assembly, to issue a new law granting them a six-month extension. Opposition negotiators 
agreed that a majority of voters in the nation as a whole (as opposed to a majority composed of 
majorities from each of the several departments) would be enough to approve a draft 
constitution. In return, the MAS consented to holding the constitutional referendum as a two-
stage affair. In the first, voters would settle questions that the Assembly itself could not resolve. 
In the second stage, the electorate would vote yes or no on a constitutional draft that incorporated 
both the results of the first referendum and the articles agreed upon by the Assembly. 
 
Despite this compromise, other disputes between the MAS and its opponents continued to 
deepen during the second half of 2007. In the eastern departments, groups critical of the Morales 
government began to organize strikes and to search for ways to gain greater autonomy from La 
Paz. Groups that backed Morales, meanwhile, began going to Sucre to pressure the Assembly to 
finish its work. Legislators began to call for closing the Assembly. Demonstrations in Sucre 
turned violent (three died and hundreds more were injured) in late November as locals 
confronted MAS supporters over whether the executive and legislative branches of government 
should be moved from La Paz, where they had been seated since 1898, back to Sucre. 
 
Constitutional Clashes 
Against this backdrop, the MAS managed to get its draft out of the Constituent Assembly. The 
MAS did this by turning to a law that allowed the Assembly to go around the two-thirds 
requirement by handing off controversial matters (defined as any points with regard to which less 
than two-thirds of the body was in agreement) to Congress, which could in turn put them to a 
referendum. This procedure was invoked through what MAS delegates later admitted was a ruse 
meant purely to get their draft promulgated. The MAS made the less-than-credible claim that an 
Assembly session comprising only MAS supporters could not reach agreement about whether the 
maximum size of agricultural properties should be 5,000 or 10,000 hectares. The MAS delegates 
had then used this alleged dispute as a pretext to send Congress a request to authorize a 
referendum on the property-size issue—along with their constitutional draft.
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 The MAS, in 
short, had shown that it favored enactment of its own draft over respect for the rule of law. 
 
In a matter of days, the MAS created a constitutional controversy of enormous proportions. 
Under normal circumstances, the opposition would have appealed to the Constitutional Tribunal, 
created in 1994, to settle this conflict. In late August 2007, however, the MAS-dominated lower 
house of Congress had, in a stormy session, voted to start impeachment proceedings against five 
of the remaining magistrates on the Tribunal because they had, earlier that year, ruled against 
Morales's use of a unilateral Supreme Decree to fill four Supreme Court vacancies while 
Congress was in recess. In response, the magistrates resigned and left the Constitutional Tribunal 
bereft of the quorum necessary to holdsessions. Although a simple majority of Congress can 
suspend Tribunal magistrates, only a two-thirds majority can approve their replacements. The 
impeachment proceedings, in other words, had decapitated the very institution entrusted with the 
responsibility of adjudicating conflicts among the branches and organs of the state. 
 
The MAS's constitutional draft is an unusual combination of classic majoritarian principles and 
devices for the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples. It seeks to maximize the power of 
the single most popular electoral force to pursue ambitious social goals and to intervene in the 
economy, and it seeks to limit the state's power to impinge upon the rights of indigenous groups. 
The draft calls for a bicameral legislature, one where members of the lower house are to be 
elected in 121 single-member plurality districts in order to form a newly named "Multinational 
Legislative Assembly." When it comes to electing the president, the draft opts for a modified 
version of Costa Rica's approach: If the top vote-getter wins at least 40 percent of the popular 
vote and finishes at least 10 points ahead of the second-place vote-getter, then the top vote-getter 
becomes president. Otherwise, there is to be a popular runoff between the two top finishers from 
the first round. No person can be consecutively elected to the presidency more than once. The 
draft also mandates the popular election of high-court judges to a judicial system in which 
indigenous, customary law will exist upon an equal footing with conventional Bolivian laws. It 
stipulates the appointment of indigenous representatives or councils to oversee such institutions 
of horizontal accountability as the National Electoral Court (CNE), the Comptroller, and the 
Central Bank. 
 
The East Drives for Autonomy 
Congress's decision in early December 2007 to reduce the share of the revenues from special 
energy taxes that each department received only complicated the vice-president's efforts to 
"dialogue" with departmental prefects between mid-December 2007 and late February 2008. At 
these meetings, opposition prefects repeated their request that the government show good faith 
by repealing both this law and the illegal promulgation of the draft constitution. The government, 
however, refused to reconsider either decision. When February 28 came and went, the 
government once again used the power of the streets and of its legislative majority to push 
forward its project for the country. 
 
In response, the opposition-dominated eastern departments organized several illegal autonomy-
seeking referendums. Between early April and late June, voters in Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, and 
Tarija approved autonomy seeking statutes that directly contradict the MAS's constitutional 
project and even the existing 1967 Constitution on several key points. Santa Cruz's autonomy 
statute, for example, will make its Departmental Legislative Assembly and its governor (as its 
prefect is now to be called) responsible for administering national resources, education, citizen 
security, and tax collection. With the Constitutional Tribunal deactivated and hence unable to 
arbitrate differences between the national government and the departments (and, by implication, 
the constitutionality of the MAS's and the opposition's behavior), the way has been opened for 
the disaffected eastern departments to increase their authority. 
 
Brinkmanship has also begun to split other key national institutions and to widen the gulf 
between the central government and the eastern departments. In early March 2008, electoral 
courts in the east refused to comply with the CNE's order to desist from organizing regional 
referenda, even as the government accepted, amid dissent within the MAS, the CNE's decision to 
delay the constitutional referendums. In the August 10 recall voting, Morales won a remarkable 
two-thirds share (with turnout at 80 percent), exceeding his 2005 total by more than 12 
percentage points. The president, however, lost in three of the eastern departments (including 
Santa Cruz), and all four prefects of the "half-moon" won their own recall elections by 
comfortable margins. 
 
Looking back, it is clear that Bolivia's decade and a half of political and economic stability 
masked deep problems. Before the mid-1980s, military officers launched 29 coups and organized 
several dictatorships. 
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 The last period of stability comparable to the final fifteen years of the 
twentieth century had occurred between 1899 and 1920, when five civilian presidents succeeded 
one another. 
 
The inability of incumbents to transform this or that passing majority into something more 
permanent is, in fact, a longstanding problem in Bolivian political life. The durability of this 
pattern suggests that structural factors, and not just the failings of particular politicians, are 
behind Bolivia's chronic instability. Bolivia remains poor, and neither neoliberalism nor the 
statism that preceded it from 1952 to 1985 has been able to stimulate much economic growth. 
Bolivia's dependence on resource rents and mineral exports has often exposed the country to 
booms as commodity prices rise, followed by disastrous busts (as when tin prices plummeted in 
the early 1980s) that undermine the profitability of other exports because of exchange-rate 
appreciation ("the Dutch disease"). Today, higher exchange rates and declining domestic 
investment are fueling inflation, which is currently expected to exceed 15 percent a year. By 
distorting markets, the "resource curse" undermines development. The huge prominence of 
minerals and natural gas also magnifies the importance of holding state power—hence the 
tradition of incumbents fixated on schemes that they believe will allow them to consolidate some 
favorable new political and social order. In an impoverished country with an underdeveloped 
economy, sadly, the costs of political folly and badly designed institutions are likely to be high 
indeed.
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An optimistic (or at least less pessimistic) reading of recent events would begin with the absence 
of any military coup or even any political stirrings from the military. Given Bolivia's putsch-
ridden history, this is no small thing. Indeed, the soldiers have remained neutral, despite the 
Morales government's loud worries about the threat of territorial fragmentation. The armed 
forces, perhaps fearing splits in their own ranks, have refused to do much more than guard 
central-government installations in the east. Whatever the ulterior motives of the MAS and its 
foes may be, each group continues to seek public approval for its actions. The press remains free, 
and plays a vibrant part in ongoing debates about the political and economic future of the 
country. Street protests and illegal referendums alike represent efforts to improve bargaining 
positions prior to the agreements that the MAS and its critics know that they will eventually find 
themselves forced to make. Stalemate, goes this interpretation of events, can be an important 
impetus behind a process of grudging compromise that will gradually, if painfully, stabilize 
Bolivian democracy. 
 
Another, grimmer forecast predicts that this stalemate will turn ever more violent. The February 
2008 congressional vote marks a shift from centripetal to centrifugal political dynamics. The use 
of referendums, whether at the departmental or national level, resolves little because the hard-
liners on either side will remain unmoved: Morales's supporters will accept nothing less than the 
enactment of a radically new constitution, while many in the east will settle for nothing less than 
extensive autonomy for their departments. That Morales so decisively won the recall referendum 
means that the MAS is unlikely to settle for anything less than the full enactment of its 
constitution. Santa Cruz prefect Rubén Costas, meanwhile, has accelerated his department's 
autonomy campaign by announcing January 2009 elections for a projected Departmental 
Legislative Assembly. Unless more moderate factions in both camps can fashion an institutional 
compromise that satisfies each side's hardliners, violence will settle what is turning out to be a 
conflict of epic proportions in the central Andes. 
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